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1. Introduction 
Alasdair MacIntyre in line with his emphasis on historicism and dialectical method 
with regard to truth and rationality has concluded that his account of Thomism is 
rationally superior to other traditions including Aristotelianism, Augustinianism, 
and even Kantianism and Nietzschian genealogy. The major theme of MacIntyre 
in assigning rational superiority and truth to a position is the dialectical success and 
the survival of the position against the strongest challenges presented against it. 
MacIntyre believes Aquinas’ Thomism has been resourceful enough to meet these 
challenges and establish its superiority. As a result of this dialectical method, Mac-
Intyre contends a feature of Thomism is its essential incompleteness. This feature 
sometimes for MacIntyre leans toward fallibilism, in the sense that we should hold 
our truth-claims always open to falsification and refutation. MacIntyre (2006, 163) 
states that considering judgments as falsifiable is a condition of warranted ascrip-
tion of truth to a theory. 
 
Only types of enquiry, we have had to learn from C. S. Peirce 
and Karl Popper, which are organized so that they can be de-
feated by falsification of their key theses, can warrant judgments 
to which truth can be ascribed (MacIntyre 2006, 163). 
 
Some critics—including Robert P. George (1989) and J. Coleman (1994)—have 
objected to MacIntyre at this point, stating that this fallibilism is not compatible 
with Thomism, as in Thomism there are eternal truths which are thought to be ir-
refutable and accessible to all; as Coleman put it, “a definition [for Aristotle and 
Aquinas] is not culture bound nor is it temporal. Both names and definition which 
grasp the essence of a subject have no temporality” (Coleman 1994, 81).  
In this paper, I seek to evaluate MacIntyre’s claim about Aquinas’ Tho-
mism, to see if it is possible to offer a cogent fallibilistic account of Aquinas’ 
thought which MacIntyre is aiming at. To this purpose, I emphasize two aspects of 
Aquinas’ thought. One is his account of the mechanisms of the intellect, and the 
second is his account of first principles. The discussion will show that Aquinas’ 
thought might be consistent with a particular kind of fallibilism, but that it does 
not cohere completely with Popperian fallibilism. 
 
2. The Intellect’s Operation and Mechanism in Aquinas’ Theory of 
Knowledge      
In this section, two issues will be sketched. The first is how, in Aquinas’ view, the 
intellect operates. The purpose of this discussion is to explain the activity of intel-
lect in attaining knowledge. The second issue is to explain two operations of the 
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intellect, by which I seek to explain further Aquinas’ epistemological optimism and 
its scope. 
 
2.1. Intellect’s Operation in Aquinas’ View 
Aquinas has made a distinction between cognition (perceptive knowledge) and 
knowledge (science). Knowledge or scientia is a perfect understanding provided by 
the intellect. Cognition is what we perceive by our senses. We cannot get a full un-
derstanding of a thing through our senses, since our external senses are selective 
and provide a partial picture of the thing. The disparate data received through the 
senses should be reassembled by the internal senses or the intellect to produce a 
complete picture of the thing. In this process firstly phantasms and secondly intel-
ligible species are produced, respectively, by the imagination and the intellect 
(Eardley and Still 2010, 51-56). A phantasm is made out of disparate perceived da-
ta that represent the thing in its completeness, and is the thing’s likeness. In the 
next stage, the universal features of the thing are abstracted from the phantasm by 
the intellect, and so intelligible species are produced. 
An intelligible species is also the likeness of a thing, but unlike a phantasm, 
it is totally de-individualized and de-materialized. The phantasm of a red car still 
pertains to one particular red car, but its intelligible species includes only the na-
ture of a car, leaving aside all particular conditions that pertain to this particular car 
(Eardley and Still 2010, 51-56).  
An intellect, in order to achieve knowledge, should grasp the essence of 
things. The perception of the accidental attributes like colour and texture is not 
enough to yield scientia. To know the thing perfectly, the intellect should under-
stand its four causes—the material, formal, efficient, and final cause—and its ef-
fects. This perfect knowledge is not an instantaneous and individual endeavour; 
rather, it is a collective and a long enterprise, and it is even possible that such 
knowledge will never be obtained. The intellect should distinguish between the ac-
cidental and the essential features of a thing. This process, however, does not ap-
ply to artefacts, since their forms are imposed on their matter, and they do not 
have essences like those of natural things, so no artefact qualifies as a substance, 
but we can understand their four causes and effects to know them perfectly (Eard-
ley and Still 2010, 8-60).       
Intellect has an active role in providing cognition and knowledge. Things 
are only potentially intelligible; they become actually intelligible when the intellect 
reassembles the disparate object produced by the external senses into the phan-
tasm, and then abstracts the universals from it in the intelligible species (Eardley 
and Still 2010, 54-55). Without the operation of the internal senses and the intel-
lect all the data received from the object by the external senses are disparate and 
un-integrated due to the partiality of each of the senses. It is the intellect that 
combines these data to provide a picture that is intelligible and might match the 
real object. In this process, both the intellect and the thing get actualized from a 
prior state of potentiality. The thing becomes actually intelligible while it was only 
potentially intelligible before; the intellect actually possesses the form of the thing 
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while it had the form potentially before; or better put it, it had only the potentiality 
to receive the form.  
 
2.2. Aquinas’ Epistemological Optimism 
For Aquinas, John Jenkins (1997, 112-13) argues, “each potency receives intrinsic 
ordination [direction] to its proper object”; therefore, errors only enter in the op-
eration of potencies that are under the control of the will, and have the possibility 
to act in different ways. Intellect as a potency has the quiddity of things as its ob-
jects, and is not deceived in its grasp of the quiddities. This is the same as for sight 
when the organ is healthy, and there is not any impediment to seeing (Jenkins 
1997, 112-13). 
Aquinas discusses the directedness of the intellect toward its proper ob-
jects. He holds a very optimistic view to the intellect’s capacities, according to 
which the intellect—like other cognitive faculties—does not or even cannot err in 
cognizing its proper object; the quiddity or the essential attributes of a thing is the 
proper object of intellect, thus it does not err in knowing them.  
 
Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its 
own proper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the 
intellect is the "quiddity" of a material thing; and hence, proper-
ly speaking, the intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity 
(Summa Theologica 85-6). 
 
Aquinas does not explain adequately why the intellect does not err with regard to 
its proper objects, or why being the proper object of the intellect precludes errors. 
One way to explain this is that, in Aquinas’ view, the intellect at this stage is not 
dealing with composites. In Aquinas’ view, the possible errors of the intellect 
come in when it composes and divides concepts in a way that does not correspond 
to reality: 
 
By accident, however, falsity can occur in this knowing of quid-
dities, if the intellect falsely joins and separates. This happens in 
two ways: when it attributes the definition of one thing to an-
other, as would happen were it to conceive that “mortal rational 
animal” were the definition of an ass; or when it joins together 
parts of definitions that cannot be joined, as would happen 
were it to conceive that “irrational, immortal animal” were the 
definition of an ass (Questiones Disputatae de Veritate I-XII). 
 
The discussion so far shows that for Aquinas, error does not enter into the intel-
lect’s first operation of defining things as it is dealing with the quiddity of things as 
its proper object. In sum, the intellect has the capacity to apprehend the essences 
of things by its natural light (Jenkins 1997, 113-114).  
Jenkins ( 1997, 115) states that though, as explained above, the intellect in 
its first operation grasps the essences fully, there is some textual evidence in which 
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Aquinas speaks about our imperfect apprehensions of some natural essences like 
flies, fire and bees2. Indeed, as Pasnau (2004, 166) points out, in Aquinas’ view, 
“the knowledge of an essence is not an all-or-nothing affair.” The intellect has a 
rough account of essences which is adequate to some extent, but is not complete. 
Human cognitive capacity is so weak, in Aquinas’ view, that he states “no philoso-
pher could have ever completely investigated the nature of a single fly” (Aquinas’ 
symbolum, cited in Pasnau 2004, 166). On this basis, Jenkins (1997, 115) con-
cludes that though, in Aquinas’ view, the intellect is veracious in identifying natural 
kinds and distinguishing them according to their essences, or in other words it is 
able “to cut the world at its joints”, it is not able at least initially to apprehend the 
whole essence of some things; the intellect in these cases uses reasoning to move 
from an imperfect to a full grasp of the essences. In this interpretation, we need to 
use fallible discursive reason to come to a full grasp of some essences, and since 
our grasp of the essentials is deficient we should instead use accidents in our defi-
nitions of the things; however, in Jenkins’ view (1997, 117), Aquinas may still hold 
that intellect due to its abilities and natural light can claim the correspondence of 
its ideas to the essences that are casually responsible for the formation of the 
phantasmata. Our intellect in its initial understanding “cuts the world at its joints” 
though it has many things to learn through discursive reasoning. In Jenkins’ view 
(1997, 126), this assurance about the correspondence of the intellect’s ideas to real-
ity, despite the incomplete understanding of essences, indicates that Aquinas is 
epistemologically optimistic. The acknowledgment of the role of reason by Aqui-
nas mitigates to some degree what might otherwise appear to be an unrealistic op-
timism with regard to the power of intellect; as he himself puts it, the need to rea-
son is correlated with human beings’ imperfect knowledge: 
 
 … to reason is to advance from one thing understood to an-
other, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, 
who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of in-
telligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to an-
other; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental dis-
cussion…(Summa Theologica I.79.8).  
 
The above quote implies that the need to reason is a consequence of imperfect 
human knowledge. This approach can be used to support democratic and delibera-
tive kinds of reasoning, since our knowledge of things is limited and partial, and 
needs to be complemented through dialectical and discursive reasoning. This line 
of reasoning can be used as a response to some critics of MacIntyre, including 
George (1989) and Coleman (1994), who claim that for Aquinas some truths are 
evident to all. According to these critics, as was mentioned in the beginning of the 
article, “a definition [for Aristotle and Aquinas] is not culture bound nor is it tem-
poral. Both names and definition which grasp the essence of a subject have no 
temporality” (Coleman 1994, 81). While according to the interpretation just of-
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fered, though Aquinas is optimistic about the capacity of the intellect, this opti-
mism does not apply to the second operation of the intellect in which it forms 
judgments; indeed, as argued above, his optimism does not apply to all of the first 
operation. The intellect will gradually know the essence, and thus, the element of 
temporality comes in. As will be explained further in the next section, the enquirer 
begins its enquiry from contingent points, and not from self-evident principles, 
and finally might arrive at first principles. These contingent starting points are cul-
ture-dependent, in the sense that they might differ across cultures. Therefore, falli-
ble and dialectical reasoning is compatible with Aquinas’ thought. This is despite 
the fact that MacIntyre (2006, 162-3) claims Aristotle and Aquinas have not ade-
quately taken into account that progress in enquiry is often torturous and uneven, 
and that it might even result in regress and frustration. 
 
3. Aquinas’ Account of First Principles 
Another approach that can be used to support a fallibilistic interpretation of Aqui-
nas is based on his account of first principles. First principles are the principles 
which are used as the foundations of theoretical and practical reasoning. Accord-
ing to the modern and the Cartesian understanding of first principles, these princi-
ples are epistemological propositions, in the sense that they are or should be self-
evident and distinct ideas that do not need to be derived from other propositions. 
MacIntyre is critical of this epistemological account of first principles, and imputes 
a dialectical interpretation of first principles to Aquinas, which, in turn, yields a fal-
libilistic account of his theory of truth.      
MacIntyre’s view of dialectical method rests on two denials. The first is 
denying the possibility of knowing the first principles of knowledge at the begin-
ning of an enquiry; the second is denying the need for an initial knowledge of the 
first principles as a condition of acquiring knowledge. Instead, in his view, first 
principles become known at the end of enquiries. MacIntyre, from an anti-
Cartesian perspective, argues that enquiries start from established contingent be-
liefs, not from first principles which are self-evident to every rational and compe-
tent agent. The mind through a dialectical method might finally know the first 
principles regarding some matter or phenomenon (MacIntyre 2006, 146-147). 
The enquirer in the Thomistic perspective, unlike the Cartesian view, does 
not need to know and be aware that he knows something. The mind might, in fact, 
know first principles and use them in its enquiries, but it might not be aware of the 
fact that it knows them, and is using them. In the Cartesian view, by comparison, 
first principles should be knowable, distinct and indubitable at the beginning of 
any enquiry.  
 
For the Cartesian it is always a reference backwards to our start-
ing-point that guarantees our knowledge, and hence, it is only 
through knowing that we know that we know. By contrast, for 
the Thomist our present knowledge involves reference forward 
to that knowledge of the arche/principium which will, if we 
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achieve it, give us subsequent knowledge of the knowledge that 
we know (MacIntyre 2006, 149). 
    
MacIntyre argues that the mind by becoming adequate by means of a dialectical 
method might finally be able to know the first principles, which it has used unwit-
tingly in its enquiries (MacIntyre 2006, 149). 
In this view, Aristotelian and the Thomistic first principles—arche for Aris-
totle and principium for Aquinas—are not epistemological principles. First princi-
ples for Aquinas express metaphysically immediate principles in a sense which I 
shall shortly explain. In this view, the fact that some principles are fundamental to 
a belief-structure, such that other principles are derivable from them, and that they 
themselves are not derivable from others, does not qualify them as first principles. 
First principles for Aquinas express what is ontologically immediate, in the sense 
that as a matter of fact they constitute the essence of the thing. For instance, the 
proposition “the human being is a rational animal” has some factual counterparts 
in the being of human beings; the proposition is not only an epistemological foun-
dation, which is self-evident to the mind. If it is evident to the mind, in the Tho-
mistic view, this is due to the fact that the proposition expresses some features of 
the object, and the mind dialectically has become adequate to the object so as to 
know its nature; accordingly, for such a mind, one that is adequate to the object, 
the proposition regarding the objects’ essentials becomes self-evident. First princi-
ples might not be knowable at the beginning of an enquiry, because the mind 
might not yet be adequate to the object. The process of adequation of mind to its 
objects is a gradual and dialectical process. 
Aquinas’ view concerning the metaphysical immediacy of self-evident prin-
ciples leads him to distinguish the principles which are self-evident per se, from the 
principles which are self-evident for us. The former are metaphysically and as a 
matter of fact self-evident, whether or not we know them; the latter are epistemo-
logically self-evident to us as well. 
 
A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one 
hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-
evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because 
the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man 
is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If 
therefore, the essence of the predicate and subject be known to 
all, the proposition will be self-evident to all (Summa Theologica, 
I.2.1). 
 
As MacDonald’s puts it, Aquinas here is not engaged in a strictly epistemological 
enterprise, since what is at stake here are the natures and the quiddities of things 
and not propositions as truth-bearers. In Aquinas’s view, soul has certain cognitive 
powers which let the subject have cognition of the nature of things. In this view, 
cognition of immediate propositions relies on having a true knowledge of the es-
sences used in those propositions. For instance, the proposition “the human being 
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is a rational animal” would be an immediate first principle, if we have a true grasp 
of the nature of human beings, and realize that the predicate used in the proposi-
tion is present in the real definition of the subject, in the sense that it expresses 
some reality about the subject of the proposition, and corresponds to its reality 
(MacDonald 1993, 181). MacDonald (1993, 179-80) holds that in Aquinas’s view, 
the kind of justification acquired through immediate propositions and based on 
the cognition of natures is an ideal and paradigmatic justification quite difficult to 
attain. There are two other kinds of justification beside this ideal case; one is 
demonstrative justification—sciential—and the other is non-demonstrative and 
probabilistic-dialectical reasoning. The latter is based on uncertain and non-
necessary propositions held by most people that produce a positive epistemic sta-
tus in the agent which amounts to taking them as true propositions. 
This picture of first principles is congruent with dialectical and fallibilistic 
reasoning, because we at the beginning do not and do not need to know the self-
evidence of first principles; rather we start with contingent beliefs, and in a process 
of discursive and argumentative reasoning attempt to arrive at an adequate picture 
of the thing in our mind, as is pointed to in Aquinas’ definition of truth as “the 
conformity of thing and intellect” (De Veritate, q.1, article 2).  The sign of having 
an adequate picture of the things, in MacIntyre’s view, is that the account can sur-
vive against all opposing challenges to it (MacIntyre 1988, 358). 
All told, we should not confuse the kind of fallibilism which Aquinas’ 
thought might allow for with a Popperian version of fallibilism. A full discussion 
of the different between the two accounts of fallibilism is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but suffices it here to note that, in my view, the truth/certainty distinction, 
which Popper (1994, 4) has made might not appear in the Thomistic view. While 
in Popper’s view (1994, 4), knowledge consists in the search for truth, and not for 
certainty, from a Thomistic/MacIntyrean perspective, the fact that we can discov-
er our errors and realize the unstable nature of sciences tacitly assumes some cer-
tain knowledge. On such a basis, though we hold our judgments to be fallible, it 
does not mean that we should be agnostic about our current knowledge; further-
more, the very act of falsification is based on some truths of which we are certain, 
which are used as the measures of falsification. In MacIntyre’s view (2006, 12), 
putting judgments in question and their falsification requires the context of a tradi-
tion which is replete with different certainties: 
 
Although, therefore, any feature of any tradition, any theory, 
any practice, any belief can always under certain conditions be 
put in question, the practice of putting in question, whether 
within a tradition or between traditions, itself always requires the 
context of a tradition. Doubting is a more complex activity than 
some skeptics have realized. To say to oneself or to someone 
else "Doubt all your beliefs here and now" without reference to 
historical or autobiographical context is not meaningless; but it 
is an invitation not to philosophy, but to mental breakdown, or ra-
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ther to philosophy as a means of mental breakdown (MacIntyre 
2006, 12). [Emphasis added] 
 
The main reasons that can account for this difference might be summarized in 
Aquinas’ theological reliabilism and the hierarchical order of his Summa Theologica. 
By reliabilism, I mean the view that our cognitive capacities are in principle in or-
der such that we can come to know the world; Aquinas has a theological version 
of this view, which holds our cognitive capacities have this character as they are 
created by a benevolent Creator to let us know the world as it is (MacDonald 
1993, 185). 
The hierarchical order of the Summa, in MacIntyre’s view (1988, 172), en-
dows Aquinas with more rational confidence, because the answers to questions are 
ordered hierarchically such that the more fundamental truths are taken as certain 
knowledge. This picture is different from the swamp-picture of science offered by 
Popper: 
 
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of 
its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building 
erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the 
swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we 
stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached 
firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the 
piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time 
being (Popper 1959, 94).  
 
4. Conclusion  
In this paper I attempted to provide a basis for MacIntyre’s fallibilistic interpreta-
tion of Aquinas’ theory of knowledge. I argued that Aquinas’ optimistic episte-
mology does not apply to the second operation of the intellect in which it forms 
compositions and judgments. Indeed, in his view, such optimism is not even seam-
less with regard to the first operation of the intellect. From another perspective, I 
argued that Aquinas’ account of first principles, in some interpretations like that of 
MacIntyre, is not epistemological, which means we might not have the full 
knowledge of them and of their evidence at the beginning of our enquiries; rather, 
we possess this knowledge dialectically when the intellect becomes adequate to its 
object. This process is gradual, dialectical and open to falsification. I argued that 
the need to engage in discursive reasoning, in Aquinas’ view, stems from our hu-
man condition, and from the limited and uncompleted nature of our knowledge. 
In passing, I pointed to some profound differences between a Popperian and a 
Thomistic fallibilism. In my view, Aquinas theological and metaphysical convic-
tions do not allow him to endorse a full-fledged Popperian fallibilism.  
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